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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

Mississippi's RECOGNITION OF A PRIVACY RIGHT
TO REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT

In re Brown,
478 So. 2d 1033 (Miss. 1985)
FACTS

On August 8, 1985, Mattie Brown, aged 47, was transported
to Hinds General Hospital. She had been shot and seriously wounded during a family disturbance. The attending physician recommended surgery supported by blood transfusions to keep Brown
alive. Brown evinced a desire to live and to have the requisite
operation. She refused, however, to have the transfusion. Brown,
a Jehovah's Witness, maintained that receiving the blood of others
is proscribed by the Bible. 1
Brown's daughter was charged with aggravated assault in the
shooting incident and was additionally charged with the rat poison murder of her father. Mattie Brown was to be a key witness
in the cases against her daughter. To minimize the risk that Mattie Brown would die before testifying, the Hinds County District
Attorney applied for an order from the Chancery Court of Hinds
County mandating that Brown receive the blood transfusion. On
August 26, 1985, the order was entered. On August 29, 1985,
a motion by Brown's counsel to vacate the order as an infringement of the rights to the free exercise of religion and to privacy
was overruled by the Chancery Court.'
The surgery and attendant transfusions were performed. Brown
pursued an emergency appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court
and insisted that the issues of the right to privacy and to the free
exercise of religion were not yet moot.' On September 11, 1985,
the court learned that further surgery was needed by Brown and
that supportive blood transfusions were again recommended to
accompany the operation. Following oral argument on Septem-

1. In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033 (Miss. 1985).
2. Id. at 1035.
3. Id. at 1036.
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ber 12, 1985, the court ruled that the lower court orders requiring Brown to submit to blood transfusions be vacated.'

INTRODUCTION

At the outset of its opinion, the Mississippi Supreme Court
recognized the privacy of the rights of an individual when those
rights are confronted by a competing interest of the state. Mattie
Brown's rights to bodily privacy and to the free exercise of her
religion were held to be paramount to the interest of the state in
preserving her testimony. 5 This note examines an individual's right
under Brown, predicated upon the exercise of the right to privacy, to refuse to allow a bodily intrusion conducted under the aegis of governmental authority.
Treatments of the general right to privacy have been ably formulated elsewhere. 6 From the initial consideration of the right
"to be let alone" as a variant form of property, 7 the right to privacy has proven a fecund ground for commentators as new dimensions of the right have been explored.! Not expressly stated in
the constitution, the right to privacy exists as a "penumbra" of
the individual freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and
"formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them
life and substance." 9
In the landmark case of Roe v. Wade,"° the United States
Supreme Court upheld the right of a pregnant woman to have an
abortion, subject only to the interest of the state in preserving the
woman's health and in protecting the well-being of a viable fetus.
Taking judicial notice that women having an abortion during the
4. Id. (The additional surgery was performed on Mattie Brown without blood transfusions. She has now
recovered from her bullet wound and the operations which saved her life.).
5. Id. at 1041.
6. E.g., L. TmE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978) (extensive listing of privacy cases and de-

velopment of the constitutional doctrine of privacy; interesting presentation that "the protections of personhood
span the spectrum-from the most hardy to the most tender"); Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS
L. REv. 275, 281 (1974) (broad definition of privacy urged as "control over when and by whom the various
parts of us can be sensed by others").
7. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
8. See, e.g., W. PROSSER,HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 117 at 804-14 (4th ed. 1971); Byrn, Compulsory Lifesaving Treatment for the Competent Adult, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1975); Cantor, Privacy and
the Handling of Incompetent Dying Patients, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 243 (1977); Shattuck, National Identification Systems, Computer-Matching, and Privacy in the United States, 35 HAST. L. J. 991 (1984).
9. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.479, 484-85 (1965) (held unconstitutional a statute which prohibited
the furnishing of contraceptive information).
10. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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first trimester of pregnancy may be subject to a lower mortality
rate than if they proceeded to normal childbirth, the Court held
the state's interest became "compelling" at the end of the first
trimester." Prior to that time, the woman has the right to determine her own bodily freedom with respect to abortion decisions.'"
The right of an individual to assert a privacy zone encompassing
the ability to regulate intrusive bodily incursions, absent a compelling state interest to the contrary, was the early legacy of Roe
v. Wade.
A comprehensive list of the federally protected interests that
qualify as privacy rights has not yet been, nor is it likely to be,
forthcoming. It is clear, however, that familial duties and relationships qualify," as well as the broader "interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions."' Much
of the interstitial development of the individual's right to refuse
intrusive acts against his person has accordingly been left to the
respective states."5 The court in Brown found the right of a witness to a crime to refuse state-requested medical treatment to be
independently grounded in Mississippi law1" and to be "well within the federally recognized right to privacy."" Due to a lack
of local precedent, the court considered similar issues raised in
other jurisdictions in reaching its decision. The result of the Brown
decision is an activist extension of the right to bodily selfdetermination. Correspondingly, it raises anew questions of the
limits of the right, the persons able to exercise the right, and the
point of legitimate interference with the right by the state.

BACKGROUND

Limits to the unfettered discretion of an individual to determine
11. Id. at 163.
12. Id.
13. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (privacy rights include at least the areas of "marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education").
14. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977).
15. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); Read v. State, 430 So. 2d 832, 841 (Miss. 1983).
16. MIss. CONST. art. HIl § 32 (1890) provides simply: "The enumeration of rights in this Constitution
shall not be construed to deny and impair others retained by, and inherent in, the people."; Deaton v. Delta
Democrat Publishing Co., 326 So. 2d 471, 473 (Miss. 1976) (unwarranted invasion of minors' privacy by
newspaper article protected by state common law).
17. In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1333, 1040 n. 7 (Miss. 1985); see also Carey v. Population Services Intl,
431 U.S. 678 (1977); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983);
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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the control of his body have been recognized by the court.18 No
decision rendered in Mississippi or elsewhere prior to Brown has
evaluated the specific issue of whether a witness to a crime may,
by invoking the right to privacy, refuse to accept medical treatment dictated by the state. Related situations involving invasive
procedures have served, however, to delimit the ability of agents
of the state to override the right of bodily privacy . Comparison
of the traditional rights to refuse medical treatment and the relatively recent assertions of bodily privacy rights by those in the
custody of the state with the interests sought to be protected by
the state offers a guide to the balancing criteria required by the
courts.
A general right to refuse medical treatment may be claimed by
competent adults and has found support in the courts." In Mississippi, this right is further protected by statutory mandate." The
doctrine of informed consent acts as an historical buttress for the
exercise of the right to bodily privacy. Irrespective of the finer
intentions of the party providing medical treatment, the failure
to obtain the consent of the patient to a specific protocol may constitute a battery. 2 The capacity to exercise independent judgment
in evaluating whether or not to undergo specific medical treatment has been found in minors when they possess the ability of
the average person to understand and weigh the benefits and
dangers of the treatment.2
When given, the consent of an individual is limited to the type
18. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973) ("The Court's decisions recognizing a right of privacy also
acknowledge that some state regulation in areas protected by that right is appropriate"); Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upheld state's authority to require smallpox inoculations for the public welfare); Union
Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (although 'no right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded," the right to bodily control may be impeded by "clear and unquestionable authority of law").
19. Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hosp. 602 F. Supp. 1452 (D.C. 1985) (patient has ultimate decision regarding acceptable medical treatment); Zant v. Prevatte, 248 Ga. 832, 286 S.E. 2d 715 (1982) (forced
feeding of prisoner violates right of privacy); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 353 A.2d 647 (1976) (guardian has
right to discontinue exceptional medical treatment of unconscious ward). But cf.Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (state requested blood test was reasonable to determine whether automobile driver was
intoxicated).
20. See generally Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973) (privacy is of constitutional dimensions); Reikes
v. Martin, 471 So. 2d 385, 392 (Miss. 1985); Bratling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 220 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1978).
21. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-101, et.
seq. (Supp. 1986). Section 41-41-101 reads, "[t]he purpose of sections 41-41-101 et. seq. is to allow a person to authorize the withdrawal of life-sustaining mechanisms from
his body under the conditions provided by sections 41-41-103 et.seq." Id.
22. See Pizzalotto v. Wilson, 437 So. 2d 859 (La. 1983)(court found battery resulted from unauthorized
hysterectomy performed by surgeon on young woman who had wanted children); Beck v. Lovell, 361 So.
2d 245 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (where patient had crossed out relevant portion of surgery authorization form,
tubal ligation was battery irrespective of skill used by surgeon), writ denied, 362 So. 2d 802 (1978).
23. Gulf& Ship Island R.R. v. Sullivan, 155 Miss. 1,119 So. 501 (1928); Lacey v. Laird, 166 Ohio St.
12, 139 N.E. 2d 25 (1956) (subjected minor was eighteen years of age). Apparently, the minor's right to independent consent has not been extended to major operations.
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and extent of the risk reasonably perceived by the grantor." A
patient is accordingly free to accept or reject forms of invasive
treatment as he may direct.2" Problems arise in the application
of this right when the absence or refusal of consent to recommended medical treatment will lead to the probable death or permanent disablement of the patient. In these instances, it is
incumbent upon the courts to decide whether other persons, including the patient's children and the attending medical staff, will
be adversely affected by the patient's decision.26 Furthermore, the
state's interest in the welfare of its citizenry is inextricably intertwined with the interest of these private third-parties.
The inceptive case considering the subrogation of a patient's
interest to those responsibilities adherent to third-parties is Application of the Presidentand Directorsof Georgetown College.2 '
In Georgetown, counsel for the hospital applied to a federal Circuit Judge for a writ to compel a blood transfusion against the
wishes of a female patient, a Jehovah's Witness. The patient was
the mother of an infant child. The judge ordered transfusions be
performed as needed to save the life of the patient. Although the
patient was not compos mentis28 and was in extremis29 the judge
reasoned that the state as parens patriae had a valid interest in
stopping the mother's abandonment of the child which could result
from the mother's refusal of a blood transfusion."0
The interest of the hospital staff in avoiding civil and criminal
liability for failure to render standard medical care was also a factor
considered by the court. 1 Cognizant of the exigency of the circumstances and lack of time for reflection, the judge granted the
writ to preserve the patient's life.
The interest of the state in supporting the professional ethics
of the medical profession was further recognized in United States
v. George when a blood transfusion was authorized by court order
to be administered by Veterans Administration Hospital staff to
24. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.) (the court emphasized that it is fundamental under
American law for each adult of sound mind to determine what medical procedures he will allow), cerr. denied,
409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Gill v. Selling, 125 Or. 587, 267 P. 817 (1928).
25. Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 354 (Utah 1980) (physician must disclose any material information
to patient so that patient may determine what shall or shall not be done with his body).
26. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEDeciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment at 1- 1 (Library of Congress No. 83-600503,
HAVIORALRESEARCH
March 1983).

27. Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, rehg denied, 331
denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert.
28. Id. at 1008.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Georgetown College, 331 F.2d at 1009.
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save the life of a father of four children. 2 The mental capacity
of the patient, a Jehovah's Witness, was not in question since he
appeared alert and rational when interviewed by the judge who
issued the order. The court concluded that a patient may refuse
treatment, but may not command his physicians to pursue a treatment violative of the ethics and practice standards of the medical
profession. 3 Other courts have recently taken a dimmer view of
the roles of physician and the state in determining the ultimate
treatment of a patient."4
That the state has an interest in the preservation of life is undeniable." Yet the courts have with regularity dismissed the assertion that a general state interest in preserving life is compelling
when that assertion stands counter balanced by an individual's constitutional right to refuse medical treatment.36 The Jehovah's Witnesses, in pursuit of religious freedom, 7 have forcefully argued
that the preservation of life on earth is not of the highest value.3"
Elevated to constitutional stature, 9 the right to bodily privacy is
not likely to yield to an amorphous, generalized right of the state.
It has been philosophically stated that freedom, not life, is the
more ultimate value in our society, and that wars to keep the world
safe for democracy witness to our willingness to sacrifice life for
some higher value."'
An interest in preventing suicide has been advanced as a more
cogent argument for the state's interference with personal freedom than a blanket social regulatory claim by the state. Suicide
has been defined by one state supreme court as an act of
" 'designedly destroying one's own life by a person of years of
discretion and of sound mind.' "41 A distinction, however, exists
32. United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (Conn. 1965).
33. Id.
34. Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452 (D.D.C. 1985) (it is the patient "who
ultimately decides if treatment-any treatment-is to be given at all."); Matter of Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266, 420 N.E.2d 64 (patient's right to determine treatment is paramount to doctor's obligation to
render care), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
35. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); In.Snyder v. Holy Cross Hosp., 30 Md. App. 317, 352 A.2d
334 (1976), the state's interest in preserving the lives and wen-being of its citizenry was manifested by compelling an autopsy against the assertion of religious and privacy rights by the parents of the deceased.
36. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Reikes v. Martin, 471 So. 2d 385 (Miss. 1985).
37. Genesis 9:3-4, Leviticus 3:17, 17:10-14, Deuteronomy 12:23, Acts 15:28-29 (Jehovah's Witnesses take
the position that the Biblical prohibition against "eating blood" is a mandate against acceptance of blood in
any form, including blood transfusions.).
38. In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 ,373 (D.C. 1972) (Jehovah's Witness, arguing against a blood transfusion,
stated that his grandson, a hospital patient, 'wants to live very much.... He wants to live in the Bible's promised
new world where life will never end. A few hours here would nowhere compare to everlasting life."). The
contention appears to be that a form of spiritual suicide may result from certain forms of medical treatment.
39. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
40. Friedmann, Interference with Human Life: Some JurisprudentialReflections, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 1058
(1970).
41. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Groom, 86 Pa. 92, 97 (1878) (Justice Woodward citing Webster
with approval and adopting the term "self-murder" as synonymous with suicide).
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between the intent to commit oneself to an act designed to end
life and the refusal of medical treatment. Refusal of treatment
merely allows the patient's injury or disease to progress to its penultimate effect, which may not cause the death of the patient. Where
an individual had not voluntarily induced his life-threatening situation and had not evinced a desire to die, the court in Satz v.
Perlmutter' decided that a patient's refusal of medical treatment
was not tantamount to suicide. In Perlmutter,the court approved
the request of the patient, a seventy-three year old man with Lou
Gehrig's disease, that medical personnel disconnect a life sustaining
device. The man was mentally alert and his family supported his
decision to terminate this form of treatment. His right to the cessation of mechanical life-support systems was found by the court
to be within the constitutional privacy rights of free choice and
bodily self-determination.'
Evolving authority favors the Perlmutterapproach and supports
the proposition that a patient will be allowed to forego bodily intrusive treatment." In Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, ' the parenspatriaefunction of the state was held to protect
the "best interests""' of a person in the state's care. The court reasoned that the best interests of a patient include the unique individual viewpoint of the patient, 7 in reaching its conclusion that
the "patient's right to privacy and self-determination is entitled
to enforcement.""8 The interest of the state in compelling bodily
intrusions must be based, in the absence of a clearly exhibited
intent by an individual to commit suicide, upon more than the
stated goal of preserving that individual's life.'
Persons in the legal custody of the state are more subject to
bodily intrusions where the state seeks to enforce its criminal laws.
In Schmerber v. California,'° the Supreme Court held that a bloodalcohol test was a permissible bodily intrusion of a drunk driving
suspect where the arresting officer reasonably believed destruction of evidence was imminent. The officer had taken the suspect
to a hospital following an automobile accident and had taken ad42. Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
43. id. at 164.
44. Wons v. Public Health Trust, 500 So. 2d 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (Jehovah's Witness' refusal
of blood transfusion); Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417,427 (1977)
(both competent and incompetent persons may refuse treatment "inappropriate circumstances," a determinationof which includes a consideration of countervailing state interests).
45. Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
46. Id. at 428.
47. Id.
48. Id.at 435.
Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452 (D.D.C. 1985); Superintendent
49. E.g.,
of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
50. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (5 to 4 decision).
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ditional time to investigate the accident scene. Under these circumstances, the court concluded that natural bodily functions
would have eliminated any alcohol from the suspect's bloodstream
if a blood sample had not been taken to preserve that evidence."1
The fact that the performance of the test was conducted in a
reasonable manner by the hospital physician and not by lay personnel was recognized as significant by the Court. " Had the blood
test or other invasive procedures been administered by law enforcement personnel, a different decision could have resulted.
Schmerber sanctioned only minor bodily intrusions "under stringently limited conditions" by the state agents in exercising their
criminal enforcement duties.5 " Judicial notice of the widespread
usage of blood tests for marriage licenses, college admissions and
blood donations was taken by the court in formulating its "reasonableness" demand for any bodily privacy invasions by government. '
The balancing of the minor nature of the intrusive procedure and
the interest of the community in determining guilt or innocence
was found in Schmerber to favor the taking of compulsory blood
samples from drunk driving suspects.5 5
The mandate of Schmerber that strict standards be applied for
invasions of bodily privacy was continued in the recent case of
Winston v. Lee."6 The state of Virginia sought in Lee to compel
a robbery suspect to undergo surgery for removal from his left
chest of a bullet fired by the robbery victim. The Schmerber
balancing test of "reasonableness" was applied by the court in
weighing the risk to the suspect, the extent of intrusion upon the
suspect's bodily integrity, and the state's interest in locating evidence of a crime."' Holding that a request for compelled surgical
bodily intrusion is to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis and
may be "unreasonable" even if likely to divulge probative evidence
of crime, the court refused to order the removal of the bullet. 8
Additional substantial evidence was available to the state in its
efforts to resolve the robbery case, and testimony by physicians
indicated that general, not local, anesthesia would be desirable
if the requested operation was conducted. 59 The opinion of the
51. Id. at 770.
52. Id. at 771-72.
53. Id. at 772.
54. Id. at 771.
55. Id. at 772.
granted, 466 U.S. 934 (1984), affd, 470 U.S.
56. Winston v.Lee, 717 F.2d 888 (4th Cir. 1983), cert.
753 (1985).
57. Winston, 470 U.S. at 763.
58. Id. at 766.
59. Id. at 764.
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Court, by Justice Brennan, gave consideration to these facts,6
although it is not at all certain that their absence would have caused
the Court to reach an opposite result.
The reticence of the courts to compel invasive surgical procedures is attributable to the inherent risks involved in operations
and to the lack of any conscious control by a patient. In situations involving medical treatment of infants or mental incompetents, a court appointed guardian may be required to exercise his
best judgment to protect the patient's interests.61 The state would
be remiss in its duty to its charges if it did not assume a custodial, parens patriae role in these matters.
Persons in the custody of the state may under special circumstances be subject to less drastic forms of bodily intrusions in the
furtherance of state interests. Prisoners, in the interest of prison
security and orderly administration, may be subject to routine
visual bodily cavity examinations at the request of the governing
authority of the prison facility. 6 It has been held that a state can
also order vaccinations reasonably designed to halt the spread of
disease.63 Challenges to the authority of federal agencies to require their employees to submit to "intrusive" drug-testing procedures have succeeded only to clarify the standards of
reasonableness and have not invalidated the procedures.6 '

60. Id.
61. In re Schiller, 148 N.J. Super. 168, 372 A.2d 360 (1977) (court ordered appointment of guardian to
consent to life-saving treatment for patient suffering from gangrene, diabetes mellitus, infection, anemia); Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D.Wash. 1967) (necessary blood transfusions
for dependent children are not unconstitutional and may be ordered over parents' objections), affid, 390 U.S.
598, reh'g denied, 391 U.S. 961 (1968).
62. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
63. E.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (smallpox vaccination); Morris v. Columbus,
102 Ga. 792, 30 S.E. 850 (1898) (smallpox vaccination).
64. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987). The Fifth Circuit,
in staying the district court's injunction against a drug-testing urinalysis program by the Customs Service, found
that the program did invade an employee's expectation of privacy. However, the court concluded that the totality of circumstances test balanced in favor of the government. Factors weighed by the court included the time,
place, manner, purpose, and extent of the intrusions. Only those persons with advance notice of the tests and
who were in positions classified as "sensitive" were subject to these tests. "Sensitive" positions cover a variety
of positions involved with law enforcement, national security or a high degree of public trust pursuant to President Reagan's Executive Order 12564, 3 C.F.R. 224 (1986); see also Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp.
482 (N.D.Ga. 1985) (municipal employees terminated after compulsory urinalysis revealed traces of marijuana); McDonnell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, (S.D. Iowa 1985) (State Department of Corrections employees
held subject to blood, urine, breath analyses at the time of apparent influence of drugs or alcohol), modified,
809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987).
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DISCUSSION

The majority opinion, written by Mississippi Supreme Court
Justice Robertson, examined the broad constitutional and common law bases of Mattie Brown's assertion of her right to bodily
privacy. The Mississippi Supreme Court held that Brown's claim
to individual privacy surpassed any interest of the state in forcing her to undergo a blood transfusion. 5
The state of Mississippi argued that the prosecutions for the
murder of Mattie Brown's husband and the attempted murder of
Brown constituted a compelling interest sufficient to overcome
any objection by Brown to measures designed to save her life.
To allow a murderer to escape punishment for the lack of proper
witnesses at trial, submitted the state, would be to inflict the risk
of serial killings upon the public at large since the murderer would
be free to kill again.6" The court rejected this argument by stating
that the probability of continued murderous acts was difficult to
predict and "the danger to society of one murderer escaping prosecution are qualitatively different-and lesser-than that of a small
pox epidemic." 7 Agreeing that the interest of the state in criminal prosecution was important, the court nonetheless held that the
privacy rights of Brown were not subservient to the state's interest." One's right of bodily self-determination, according to the
court, is "peculiar to the individual." 9 This right may not be assumed by someone else and does not succeed the death of the individual.7" The Mississippi Supreme Court thus found authority
cited by the state involving a deceased person to be inapplicable
to Brown, a living and mentally competent person."
The court found that no waiver of her right to accept or reject
specific medical treatment occurred as a result of Brown's voluntary admission to a hospital facility. The state's argument to the
contrary was rejected as specious. ' The right to refuse blood transfusions, said the court, is to be curtailed "only in cases of great
and eminent public danger." ' The current association made by
65. In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033, 1040 (Miss. 1985).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1041.
68. Id.
69. Id.at 1041.
70. Id.
71. Id.at 1041. Synder v,Holly Cross Hosp., 30 Md. App. 317, 352 A.2d 334 (1976), cited by the state,
involved an autopsy conducted over the objections of members of the deceased's family.
72. In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033, 1041 (Miss. 1985).
73. Id. at 1040.
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many persons, between blood transfusions and various diseases,
though likely ill-founded,' was nonetheless presented by the court
as an example of a reason for the discretionary power of the individual to refuse medical treatment for any reason."
Questions of Brown's competence to decide what forms of medical treatment she would accept were rejected by the court. The
state argued that Brown, in the throes of injuries wrought by three
.38 caliber bullets, was not mentally fit to deny treatment on her
own behalf.' 6 The state pointed out that Brown had been previously warned of the probability that her daughter was a murderer
and that Brown continued thereafter to live with the daughter in
obvious disregard of the possible tragic consequences." Brown's
counsel argued that Brown had no desire to die and was conscious, lucid, and alert when the transfusions were refused. 8 Accepting this position, the court emphasized that its holding applied
only to cases involving competent adults.' 9 Consequently, no application of a state interest in preventing suicide was found to be
appropriate by the court in Brown. The court further noted that
just as Mattie Brown was free to dictate her course of treatment
based on the doctrine of informed consent and the right to bodily
privacy, the attending medical personnel could have declined to
continue treatment based upon unreasonable conditions.80 The
hospital and surgeon in the instant case were agreeable to continuing the recommended surgery without transfusing blood into
Brown. "
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Hawkins maintained that Brown's
individual rights to refuse medical treatment should yield to the
interest of the state in preserving her ability to testify.8" Since
Brown could not refuse to testify as a witness, the dissent argued
that the compelling of proper medical treatment is a necessary
adjunct of the state's power to compel testimony."' The dissent
concluded that a case-by-case determination is the correct approach
74. Id. According to Dr. Joseph Candelora, Ph.D., M.D., Staff Pathologist at St. Dominic's Hospital, Jackson, Miss., this assumption by the court is correct. Dr. Candelora states that testing/detection procedures for
AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome), Hepatitis A and B, and for Non-A, Non-B Hepatitis in use
by blood resource centers since 1985 are providing an effective screen against unsafe blood supplies. For a
discussion of the public response to the AIDS epidemic and the concept that "AIDS is the modem day equivalent of leprosy," see Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Service, Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 536-37 (Fla. 1987).
75. In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033, 1040 (Miss. 1985).
76. State's Brief at 4-5, In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033 (Miss. 1985) (Misc. No. 1954).
77. Id.
78. Petitioner's Brief at 2, In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033 (Miss. 1985) (Misc. No. 1954).
79. In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033, 1042 (Miss. 1985).
80. Id. at 1041.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1042.
83. Id.
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to take in balancing the individual's rights with those of the state.
In Justice Hawkins' view, had the blood transfusion been a questionable medical procedure, Brown's arguments might have been
more tangible."
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

Decisions supporting the right of an individual to refuse a blood
transfusion have traditionally been predicated upon the assertion
of the constitutional right of freedom of religion."5 Brown upholds
a person's choice to reject a blood transfusion based upon the right
to bodily privacy."
The United States Supreme Court in Winston v. Lee' again applied the Schmerber8 balancing test to hold that the state was not
permitted to compel a robbery suspect to submit to a surgical operation to obtain evidence. The opinion in Lee stated that when the
state seeks to intrude upon an area in which society recognizes
a significantly heightened privacy interest, "a more substantial"
justification is required to make the search reasonable."9
Bodily integrity is unquestionably an area of constitutional privacy entitled to protection."0 Brown extends that protection of the
individual right to bodily privacy to encompass the decision of
an individual to refuse even the most mundane invasive procedures. The individual may refuse to comply with the asserted state
interest for "motives noble or base."91
The long-standing doctrine of informed consent supports this
extension of privacy rights. From the theory that a person has
the right to determine whether or not to seek medical treatment,
it is with small effort that the right to reject a particular form of
treatment is inferred. As an analogy, the court pointed out that
mentally competent adults have the statutory right in Mississippi
to demand the cessation of mechanical life support systems.'"
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Mercy Hosp., Inc. v. Jackson, 62 Md. App. 409, 489 A.2d 1130 (1985); Holmes v. Silver
Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125 (I1. 1972); In re Brooks, 32 In. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
86. In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033, 1040 (Miss. 1985).
87. Winston v. Lee, 717 F.2d 888 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 466 U.S. 934 (1984), affd, 470 U.S.
753 (1985).
88. Schmerber v. Calif., 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
89. Winston, 717 F. 2d at 889.
90. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
91. In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033, 1040 (Miss. 1985).
92. In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033, 1040 (Miss. 1985); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101, et seq. (Supp.
1984) provide that competent persons, or those persons empowered to consent for incompetents or minors,
have the right to refuse the continuance of life-sustaining medical support mechanisms.
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RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT

Justice Robertson, by separate note in the opinion, explained that
the state admitted at oral argument that had Mattie Brown given
a confession of a crime at the time of her refusal of the blood
transfusion, that confession would have been "sufficiently, knowingly, and intelligently given so as to be admissible in a court
of law."93 This admission, when paired with the fact that Brown
had expressed no desire to die or to exclude all medical treatment, would not have allowed the court to logically find Mattie
Brown to be incompetent to make binding decisions or to withhold her consent to a medical procedure.
The difficulty in the application of the majority opinion is, as
mentioned by Justice Hawkins in his dissent, one of degree. 9' Cases
involving the balancing of delicate and, by nature, imprecise rights
do not readily avail themselves of concrete formulae. The ad hoc,
case-by-case approach to "reasonableness" as approved in Winston v. Lee is a necessary method of settling disputed issues of
personal freedoms."' The majority opinion in Brown correctly
evaluated the facts at bar before holding that the state interest in
having an eyewitness at trial was not superior to the privacy rights
of Mattie Brown. The court did not hold that an individual's bodily
privacy may never be delimited under any circumstances.
A qualification upon the right of an individual to bodily privacy does exist under Brown. The court concludes that no state
authority exists to intrude upon a person's exercise of the right
to privacy "absent evidence of imminent public danger." 6 Preservation of the state's ability to act in times of public emergency
is thus kept intact. In its statement that the effect of a murderer
being let loose upon the public is qualitatively less than an epidemic, 9 " the court does not mention whether or not conditions,
such as those created by a serial-killer could qualify as "epidemic" in magnitude. It is within the realm of modem criminal activities to envision a pattern of killings or terrorism sufficient to
create a situation that meets the "imminent danger" test. 8 The
93. In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033, 1041 n. 8.
94. In re Brown, 478 So. 2d at 1042.
95. Winston v.Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
96. In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033, 1040 (Miss. 1985).
97. Id.at1041.
98. E.g.,
People v.Gacy, 103 Ill.
2d 1,468 N.E.2d 1171-1220, (1984) (defendant convicted of thirty-three
counts of murder, one count of deviate
sexual
assault and one count of indecent liberties with a child; evidence
included numerous incidents of torture and physical abuse); Williams v. State, 251 Ga. 749, 312 S.E.2d 40
(1983) (multiple murder convictions for killings of young black males upheld despite defense references to
extensive pre-trial publicity of thepublic's fear of a killer atlarge); Corona v. Superior Court, 101Cal. Rptr.
411, 24 Cal. App. 3d 872 (1971) (murder case involving killings of twenty-five migrant farm workers). The
quantity of victims in these cases may not approach the scale of an epidemic. The type of apprehension and
the evasive measures taken by the public may, however, be of the same "quality" as those undertaken during
an epidemic.
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state's argument that a murder suspect should not be freed due
to the lack of a key witness, when the use of a widely accepted
medical procedure is available to help assure the health of that
witness, is an appealing one. The state's argument suffers,
however, from the difficulty of determining the degree of state
intervention and to what witnesses, suspects, and others it is applicable.
The decision in Brown does not, and should not, settle the broad
issue of who will be the victor when state interest and individual
privacy collide. It does follow the reasoning of the United States
Supreme Court in the decisions of Roe v. Wade99 and Winston
v. Lee. ascribing a high degree of purpose and protection to an
individual's right to bodily self-determination. The inherent rights
of the individual must not yield to fears of the moment. Brown
establishes that the safeguards of an individual's bodily privacy
are readily capable of expansion and are not to be enfeebled by
state claims of lesser stature.
Marc S. Roy

99. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
100. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985).

